The stay in Germany was lovely, and I cannot say enough good things about B. Sharon Byrd and Joachim Hruschka. They are the most kind and supportive academics I have ever met, not to mention they are brilliant Kant scholars. We had such lovely conversations and dinners, and I truly miss them. If they weren't so far away... But, the silver lining is that I did download Skype onto Sharon's computer, so we can talk that way.
At any rate, enough of the personal. We are here to talk about Kant, right?!
So what pearls of wisdom (or sources of confusion) does Kant hold for us today? I think I would like to ponder a bit about the nature of the juridical condition (this one is for you, Sharon).
By the bye to my few followers: if you are looking for an excellent book on Kant's Doctrine of Right, I highly suggest Byrd and Hruschka's new book. It is extremely well written, provocative in its arguments about the juridical/nonjuridical distinction and the three laws, and I am still pondering over their argument about Kant's table of contracts and the First Critique's categories. Do yourself a favor and bite the bullet and buy this book. Byrd and Hruschka. Kant's Doctrine of Right: A Commentary (Cambridge University Press, 2010).
What in particular am I referring to when I say that I am interested in the juridical condition? Well, I am thinking about the minimal conditions for Right. There must be judicial, legislative and executive authorities (and a public external coercive mechanism) for one to be in a juridical condition. And, it appears these are the basic conditions. Republics are, let's say, higher functioning juridical states. But, is this necessarily so? Is there a continuum of Right, say from basic minimal conditions to Republics, or are there no distinctions? Another way to think about this is:
All republics are juridical, but some juridical conditions are not republics.
The Kant scholar may be shaking her head right now, saying well of course there are degrees of right, and republics are the best. But, I want to press on this a little bit.
If a state is a despotism, it cannot be in a juridical condition. If a state is a tyranny, it too cannot be in a juridical condition. If a state has the three Kantian authorities mentioned above, it appears it is automatically a republic. Hence all republics are juridical, and all juridical conditions are republics.
Why? Well, doesn't Kant say that the legislative authority is there to formulate public laws, and that these public laws are only legitimate if they accord with the united will of the people. "Therefore only the concurring and united will of all, insofar as each decides the same thing for all and all for each, and so only the general united will of the people, can be legislative." Hmm...sounds like not just any old legislative authority will work.
Then think about the judiciary, probably the most important authority in this triumvirate. The judiciary must put a case before it, and judge whether the case is in accordance with the law (a law that was laid down via the united will of the people). The judiciary is neutral, external, and renders final and public judgments. There is no backdoor dealings for Kant's judges, let alone the question of political ideology...
Finally we have the executive. I won't say much here concerning this branch, as it is mostly an administrative authority. The executive must carry out the dictates of the court and create legal institutions at the direction of the legislature (Cf Byrd and Hruschka).
All of this leads me to believe that Kant is not discussing the minimal conditions for Right, but the ideal conditions for Right -- that is, a republic. (The idea of the state as such).
What are some of the implications of this? Well, I am still spit-balling. And, more will have to be said another day. Perhaps some of my devotees will be kind enough to brainstorm with me. Otherwise, I must be off. Other engagements await.
MKTC (More Kant to Come)
H
